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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Because contemporary growth theory has focused upon models 
with a single capital good,' allocation of investment in the dynamic 
capitalist economy had been uninvestigated until Professor Hahn's 
recent contribution.2 Hahn shows that an economy with several 
capital goods faces two crucial problems: (1) The growth path may 
be indeterminate. (2) Not all paths will converge to balanced 
growth. He concludes that the implications of these problems for 
the capitalist economy are indeed serious. The purpose of this paper 
is to examine more closely this indeterminacy and instability. 
In our analysis, we employ a model in which consumption is 
determined by a simple consumption function and the decisions on 
the allocation of investment among alternative capital goods are 
made on the basis of short-run profit maximization with short-run 
perfect foresight about capital gains. In Sections II and III, we 
show that given initial endowments there exists one and only one 
assignment of initial prices that is consistent with long-run balanced 
growth. Furthermore, in the model we treat, whenever momentary 
equilibrium is not unique, one and only one allocation of invest- 
ment is consistent with long-run balanced growth. Paths not tend- 
ing to balanced growth are shown to be intertemporally inefficient. 
And on such trajectories, the price of one of the capital goods be- 
comes zero in finite time. 
* Shell's research was supported in part by a National Science Foundation 
grant to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stiglitz's research was 
supported in part by a grant from Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge 
University. We are indebted to K. J. Arrow, A. B. Atkinson, J. S. Chipman, 
P. A. Diamond, A. R. Dobell, R. E. Hall, P. A. Samuelson, and R. M. Solow 
for helpful comments. We alone are responsible for the errors. 
1. See, e.g., R. M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic 
Growth," this Journal, LXX (Feb. 1956), 65-94. 
2. F. H. Hahn, "Equilibrium Dynamics with Heterogeneous Capital 
Goods," this Journal, LXXX (Nov. 1966). Also see F. H. Hahn, "On the 
Stability of Growth Equilibrium," memorandum, Institute of Economics, Uni- 
versity of Oslo, April 19, 1966. 
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The instability of the Hahn model is suggestive of the economic 
forces operating during "speculative booms" like the Tulip Bulb 
Mania. But such speculative booms seem to be rare exceptions in 
economic history. What prevents their occurrence? Sections IV and 
V are devoted to answering that question. 
In Section IV, we investigate in detail the implications of alter- 
native market structures for the pattern of growth. Walrasian 
futures markets extending indefinitely into the future ensure the 
stability of the economy. In the case where there are spot markets 
for used capital but no futures markets, it still remains true that the 
unique competitive equilibrium path along which expectations are 
always fulfilled is the path converging to balanced growth. But 
under our behavioral assumptions about consumption, price expecta- 
tion formation, and investment allocation, there is no mechanism 
that will ensure that initial prices chosen today are such that 
expectations are not disappointed at some later date. 
We therefore turn in Section V to an examination of the con- 
sequences of a number of alternative market and behavioral assump- 
tions; in particular, it is shown that (1) if there are no markets for 
selling and renting capital goods, then development of the economy 
is stable; and (2) if there are imperfections in foresight (if, for 
instance, individuals have static expectations about prices) the 
economy is both stable and efficient. 
Indeed, in the real world, because individuals do not have con- 
fidence in their price expectations, they tend to become skeptical 
of investments which have low real returns (machines with low 
marginal products) but high capital gains. Although Walrasian 
futures markets can ensure dynamic efficiency and stability, it is 
the "frictions" and "imperfections" in the economy (e.g., imperfect 
foresight and imperfect used capital goods markets) that probably 
provide the most important forces for stability and relative effi- 
ciency. 
II. THE ONE-SECTOR Two-CAPITAL MODEL 
Both the instability of long-run equilibrium and the lack of 
uniqueness of momentary equilibrium which Hahn observed in his 
multi-sector Cobb-Douglas economy can be studied in a one-sector 
economy with two capital goods.3 This will allow us to give the 
complete dynamic analysis, which was lacking in the more compli- 
3. Or equivalently, a three-sector model in which the capital intensities 
in all sectors are identical. 
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cated Hahn formulation. To make our analysis as close as possible 
to that of Hahn, we shall use the Cobb-Douglas production function 
to illustrate the more general problem. Then the production function 
can be written as 
(2.1) Q = F(K1, K2, L) = Klai K2a2 Ll-ai-az, al > 0, a2 > 0, 
1 - al- a2 > 0, 
where K, (i = 1, 2) is the quantity of the ith capital good, L is labor, 
and Q is output. Letting k1 = (K1/L) and k2 = (K2/L) yields 
(2.1') Q = Lf(ki, k2) = Lkla, k2a2. 
Since the consumption good and both investment goods are assumed 
to be produced by the same production function 
(2.2) Q = Z1+ Z2+ C = Kl'+,Kl+K2'+,LK2+C, 
where C O 0 is consumption, Zj = Kj' + ,u - 0 is gross invest- 
ment in the ith capital good (i = 1, 2), and u > 0 is the constant 
rate of exponential depreciation (assumed to be equal for the two 
capital goods).4 Once installed, the machines are bolted-down in the 
sense that they can no longer be transformed one into the other or 
into consumption goods. 
Following Hahn, we assume that all profits are invested and 
all wages consumed. 
(2.3) C = FLL = (f - k1if - k2f2)L= (1-al-a2)Qy 
where FL = DF/3L and f- = Df/Zkj. Since the production supply 
prices of all three commodities are identical (since they are pro- 
duced by the same production function), only the commodities with 
the highest market prices are produced. By assumption, wage and 
rental rates are equal to the marginal products of labor and capital, 
respectively, and since these are always positive, both consumption 
and investment are also always positive. Hence, taking the con- 
sumption good as numeraire we have 
(2.4) max [pi, p2] = po =- 1, 
where Pc, Pi, and P2 are the prices of the consumption good, the 
first investment good, and the second investment good, respectively. 
Of course, the equilibrium market price of output is always equal to 
the price of consumption, or max (PI, P2, 1) = 1. Under our savings 
hypothesis, the equations of capital accumulation are 
kil = Z- Xk1 = a(k1f1 + k2f2) - Ak1, 
(2.5) 
W = Z2-Xk2 = (1 - a) (kif1 + k2f2) - xk2, 
4. Primes are used to denote time differentiation. For example, 
K, = dK./dt. ? S 
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where zj _ Zj/L (i = 1, 2) and a depends upon (P2/Pl) and is given 
by 
( 1 if P2 < PI, 
ae[0, 1] if P2 = PI., 
1=0 if p2 > Pl, 
and X is the sum of the rates of depreciation and population growth, 
both of which are assumed to be constant. That is, only the invest- 
ment good with the higher price is produced.5 Since wages are equal 
to consumption, rentals must equal gross investment. However, 
when PI = P2, momentary equilibrium is not unique. A momentary 
equilibrium is an allocation of output among the consumption good 
and the two investment goods that satisfies our static behavioral 
relations (2.2) to (2.5), for currently given capital stocks, labor 
force, and prices. Nothing in this system determines the value of cr 
between 0 and 1 when Pi = P2. In Figure I, we have drawn the 
C 
/ \ / ~C 





production possibility frontier. We have then drawn, for the Cobb- 
Douglas case, the consumption line, which is the intersection of the 
production possibility frontier with a plane parallel to the (Z1, Z2) 
plane and intersecting the C axis at a value equal to (1 - a- a2)F. 
5. Notice that p, has unit (C/K,), j = 1, 2. Thus (p2/pD) has unit (K1/K2) 
which is the unit for the slope of the production possibility frontier in (Z1, Z2) 
space. By the one-sector assumption, the absolute value of the slope of the 
PPF is unity. 
"a e [0, 1]" should be read as "a belongs to the closed unit interval," i.e., 
a is such that O t o 5 1. 
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If pi > p2, it is clear that the economy operates at point A, while if 
P1 < P2, it operates at point B. But if pi = P2, any point along the 
line AB is technologically and socially feasible.6 
Thus far, we have discussed the markets equating demand and 
supply of consumption goods and demand and supply of investment 
goods. But we have yet to discuss the markets for already existing 
capital goods. We consider an individual at the beginning of the 
period with one unit of capital good one. He can hold this capital 
good and at the end of the period, the expected change in the value 
of his net worth will be (1 - ,uAtblt+At + r1At - pit, where 
vqi+Lt is the expected price of his unit of K1 at the end of the period; 
ri is the average gross rentals (in units of output per unit of time) 
he gets from the ownership of a unit of K1 and p is the rate of de- 
preciation per unit of time. 
Alternatively, he could have sold his unit of K1, received 
pit for it, purchased plt/p2t units of K2, and at the end of 
the period he would expect his net worth to have increased by 
(plt/p20) [ (1 - ttAt)2t+At + r2At - p2t]. In equilibrium, the ex- 
pected returns are the same, i.e., 
(1 - ILAt)fllt+At + riAt - pit (1 -pAt) q2t+At + r2At - p2t 
pit p2t 
If individuals have short-run perfect foresight, so that expectations 
about price changes are realized,7 then 
vl91 =Pit+At and q2t+?t - p2t+,?t 
Dividing by At, and taking the limit as At e 0 yields 8 
6. Had there been curvature to the production possibility frontier, speci- 
fying the market price ratios would have uniquely specified the output bundle. 
The question would then be: What restrictions do we have to impose upon the 
production functions of a many-capital-goods, many-sector model to ensure 
that for any two capital goods i and j, (92Z,/MZ12) be nonzero along the 
production possibility frontier? This is the problem of uniqueness of momen- 
tary equilibrium that Hahn treats in his recent paper (op. cit., pp. 638-41). 
7. "Short-run perfect foresight" may also be called "myopic foresight" 
since at any point the individual only knows the price at the next "moment." 
This is closely related to the notion of "instantaneous adjustment" which arises 
in the theory of adaptive expectations. The adaptive expectations hypothesis is 
that t' = b [0 - f], where t is the expected rate of price change, 0 is the actual 
rate of price change, and b is the coefficient of adjustment. b - 0 is the case 
of static expectations. As b -e oo the hypothesis becomes that of instantaneous 
adjustment and can be interpreted as follows: Individuals expect the right-hand 
time derivatives of price to be equal to their (actual) left-hand derivatives. 
"Long-run perfect foresight," on the other hand, means that individuals have 
expectations today about all future prices and that these expectations are 
fulfilled. 
8. To see that the dimensions of the terms are consistent, write down 
the units of each as follows: 
C/Klt C/Kit C/K2t C/K2t 
C/K1 + C/K1 lt = C/K,- + -lt lt. 
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P'/Pi1 + r1/P1 - = P2'/P2 + r2/P2 - = p 
where p is the rate of return. In a competitive economy r1 and r2 
are equated to the value marginal products of K1 and K2, respec- 
tively. Since consumption and investment are both positive, in a 
one-sector model the price of output will be equal to the price of con- 
sumption (=1). Therefore, for a competitive economy r1 = f, and 
r2 =f2. 
Therefore, we know that under short-run perfect foresight with 
short-run profit maximization 
(2.6) P1'/P1 + fI/P1 - P2'/P2 - f2/P2 = 0. 
Note that we have assumed throughout this discussion that Pi and 
P2 are positive. In Sections IV and V, we will focus on what hap- 
pens when one of the two prices becomes equal to zero. 
Balanced Growth. Since the labor force growth rate is constant, 
balanced growth implies that k1 and k2 are constant. For k1 and k2 
to remain constant, both capital goods must be produced, and hence 
both must have a price equal to the price of consumption goods 
( 1).9 Thus, in the balanced state both pl'/P, and P2'/P2 must be 
zero. Hence from (2.6), f, = f2. From (2.5), setting k1' = 0 = k2' 
gives A(k1+ k2) = f1k1+ f2k2= f1(ki+ k2), or A = f1 = f2. 
We now show that for the Cobb-Douglas case there exists a 
unique balanced growth path. Notice that fi = f2 if and only if 
k1 = a1k2/a2. For the Cobb-Douglas case, when f, = f2 
fi = (al) 1- - a2a2kjai~a2-l 
Differentiating the above with respect to ki shows that fA is decreas- 
ing in k1 along the line f, = f2. Therefore fA = f2 = A for at most 
one value of the vector (k1, k2). Since along fA = f2 
lim fA = oo and lim fi = O. 
kj->O kk-> oo 
the solution (kI*, k2*) to the system f, = alf/k, = f2 =a2f/k2 = A 
is uniquely determined.' 
III. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
There are three different regimes in which the economy may find 
itself: 
Regime I. P2 < Ph = 1, only capital good 1 is produced (cr = 1). 
9. If the Inada conditions are not satisfied, so f(0, k2) > 0, for instance, 
there may exist a balanced growth path with k1 not produced. See below, 
p. 603. 
1. For the more general case where the two capital goods are comple- 
ments (fi2> 0), the analysis is virtually unaltered. 
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Regime II. 1 = P2 > P1, only capital good 2 is produced (cr = 0). 
Regime III. p, = P2 = 1, a is indeterminate. 
The differential equations (2.5) and (2.6) reduce to (using 2.4): 2 
Regime I Regime II Regime III 
(3.11) kl' = - Xk1 (3.1.II) ki' = -Xki (3.1.III) ki' = o'm - Xk1 
(32.1) k2' =- Xk2 (3.21I) k2' = - Xk2 (3.2.III) k2' = (1 -) - Xk2 
(3.3.1) pl' = 0 (3.3.II) pi! = p112 - f' (3.3.III) pi' = p + A -f 
(3.4.I) p2' = p2f -f2 (3.4.II) p2' = 0 (3.4.III) p2' = p + g - f2 
where profits per capita ir = (a, + a2)q with q denoting output per 
capita. 
Although this is a system of four "differential equations" in k1, 
k2, P1, and P2, our simple assumptions about production and demand 
for consumption allow us to make a complete dynamic analysis of 
the system in (k1, k2) "phase" space. In Figure II we have drawn 
the ray OA along which ki = k2a1/a2 (i.e., along which fi = f2). 
Above OA, f2 > fl; below OA, A > f2. 
In Regime I, kl' = 0 along the curve denoted in Figure II by 
OB which is the locus of points such that 
1 
= [ (ai + a2) k2a] 1-al 
Differentiating yields 
( dk2 )* to> 0 and < 0. 
Similarly for Regime II we can describe the locus of points such that 
k2' = 0, and this curve is denoted in Figure II by the curve OC. 
Thus, Figure II is divided into six basic regions: A1 which lies 
to the right of the k1 (vertical) axis and above OA, OB, and OC; 
2. It is important to observe that because o- is an upper semicontinuous 
correspondence, (2.5) and (2.6) do not define a dynamical system of the sort 
treated in the standard mathematical treatises. The solutions, k1(t), k2(t), pl(t) 
and p2(t) can be shown, however, to be continuous although not in general 
differentiable. 
While the economy is in Regime I, a = 1, and the solution to (2.5) is con- 
tinuous. Hence, fi and f2 are continuous and bounded, so pA/P2 is continuous (by 2.6). Thus, by (2.4); pi must remain at unity; so p'= 0. Similarly in 
Regime II. In Regime III the value of ir e [0, 1] is undetermined. (To avoid 
pathologies we assume that there are at most a finite number of discontinuities 
in or in any finite interval of time.) If Regime III is to be maintained, 
pi=p2=1, so p =p2=0, and o must be chosen so that fl=p+ /= f2. 
Thus, k1/k2 must remain constant, and since k1 + k2 is continuous, ki and k2 
must be continuous. 






A2 which lies above OA and below OB; A3 which lies above OC and 
below OA and OB; A4 which lies above the k2 (horizontal) axis and 
below OC and OB; A5 which lies above OB and below OC; A6 
which lies below OA and above OB and OC. The solid arrows indi- 
cate the direction of development in the respective regions when 
= 1 (Regime I). The dashed arrows indicate the direction of 
development when a = 0 (Regime II). 
So far, we have ignored the behavior of prices. We recall that 
in Regime I, P2'/P2 = f - f2/P2. If the economy is in Regime I and 
above OA (i.e., f2 > fi), we know that fl < f2/P2 since PI > P2. 
Thus, in this case P2 falls and as long as the economy is above OA it 
cannot switch to Regime II. It continues to specialize investment in 
the capital good with the lower marginal product - a clear instance 
of the Keynesian 3 disparity between social and private returns due 
to capital gains. Similarly, if the economy is in Regime II and below 
OA, as long as it is below OA it cannot switch to Regime I. 
We are now ready to put all this information to use for a full 
3. See J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), esp. Chap. 12. 
600 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
dynamic analysis. Consider, for example, an economy which begins 
initially in A2. If the economy begins with Pi > P2 (i.e., in Regime 
I), it must remain in Regime I, so that the economy moves towards 
the curve OB, crosses it, and then moves towards the origin. 
If initially P2 > pi and initially the economy is in A2, it moves 
towards OA, but since Pi'/Pi = f2- fi/Pi and fi < f2, if Pi is suffi- 
ciently large (> fl/f2), P' is rising. It is possible then that, before 
the economy gets to OA, Pi becomes equal to P2 (= 1).4 But since 
fl < f2, P2 must begin to fall,5 and we switch to Regime I. From 
then on the story follows as before. Alternatively, the economy can 
cross the ray OA with P2 greater than Pi. The story for the economy 
in Regime II in A3 is analogous to that of the economy in Regime I 
in A2. The economy moves to OC, crosses it and proceeds to the 
origin. 
Oneimportant case remains: The economy begins in A2 with 
P2 > Pi, but PI = P2 at exactly the moment that fA = f2. The 
economy is then in Regime III in which momentary equilibrium is 
not unique.6 There is a unique allocation o* which will enable the 
economy to move along the ray OA to the steady-state solution; we 
require k1'/k2' to equal the slope of OA 
a1 a7*7r xkl 
a2 ( 1-(oA7r-xk2 
4. Observe that in this case, at the point where pi = p2, the system lacks 
uniqueness of monetary equilibrium. But this nonuniqueness lasts only for a 
moment. The amount of capital accumulation which occurs during that mo- 
ment is infinitesimal, regardless of the value which a takes on in that moment. 
The next moment, p2 > pi, and the economy's path is unaffected by what hap- 
pens in the moment of nonuniqueness of equilibrium. Hence, although the 
economy lacks uniqueness of momentary equilibrium, it is not causally inde- 
terminate. 
5. Since p',/p, - p'2/p2 = f2/p2 - f1ip > 0, pi must fall relative to P2, but 
max (pI, p2) = 1, so P2 remains at 1, and P2 falls below 1. 
6. It can be shown that for any given initial endowment there exists one 
and only one initial price assignment which will get the economy to the OA 
ray at exactly the same moment that ji = p2 = 1. Observe that if the economy 
begins above OA and remains in Regime II, it must, in finite time, cross OA, 
since 
d log (k2/k,) 
dt = 7r/k2 > 0 
The right-hand side, in the region above OA, is clearly bounded away from 
zero, and hence in finite time, for all initial values of k1/k2 greater than ai/a2. 
the economy eventually reaches OA. The behavior of the real system (i.e., 
k1, k2) is independent of the particular prices chosen, provided that we remain 
in Regime II. Hence, the values of k1 and k2 along the path which goes from 
the initial value of (k,, k2) to a point on OA are determined at every point 
of time, and continuous in time and consequently, f, and f2 are determined as 
continuous functions of time alone. Since the Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tion is analytic, the price differential equation satisfies the Lipschitz condition 
and hence the price differential equation, with the terminal condition p,(t*) = 1 
where t* is the time at which fh = f2, has a unique backward solution. 
THE ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT 601 
or 
C < cy* = < 1. 
al + a2 
If or deviates from ur* for more than an infinitesimal length of 
time, clearly fi will no longer equal f2. If, for instance, a < a*, k2 
becomes slightly greater than a2ki/ai, i.e., fi becomes greater than 
f2. Our price differential equation, for Regime III, is P2' - P1' = 
f - f2 > 0. Hence Pi decreases relative to P2 (= 1), and the 
economy moves into Regime II. From then on, the story is familiar. 
But in the model as presented thus far there is no mechanism 
with only short-run perfect foresight by which a can be maintained 
at v*. 
The dynamic behavior for the economy with initial endow- 
ments in other regions can be analyzed in a similar manner. For 
each initial assignment of the endowment vector (kj, k2), there is 
one and only one assignment of initial prices (Pi, P2) that allows the 
economy to proceed to long-run balanced growth. We have shown 
that, if we assign a = r* in Regime III, the unique balanced growth 
equilibrium is a saddlepoint in the (k1, k2, P', P2) phase-space.8 So 
far, there is no mechanism endogenous to the model which ensures 
that initial prices will be chosen so as to allow for long-run balanced 
growth. Paths not tending toward balanced growth tend to the 
origin, and even along paths which allow for long-run balanced 
growth there is no mechanism to ensure that cr = v* in Regime III. 
Moreover, along paths not tending to balanced growth, the 
price of one of the two capital goods goes to zero in finite time.9 To 
see this, consider once again the economy above OA (f2 > fi) but 
in Regime I. Defining /3 = f1/f2 and using (3.4.I) yields 
(3.5) P2' =(P23 - 1)f2 <0. 
7. If the economy begins in A1 in Regime II, it either moves into A2, 
from which point the story is familiar, or p2 = pi before the economy gets to 
OB in which case it switches to Regime I. But in Regime I and in A1, the 
economy cannot switch to Regime II and must proceed toward the origin 0. 
The behavior in As and A4 is symmetrical to that in A1 and A2. Observe from 
Figure II that an economy in A2 or Ad ultimately must proceed to A1, A2, As 
or A4. 
8. It is important to remember that a is not a single valued function of 
pi and p2. Therefore, the usual associated-linear-system analysis cannot be per- 
formed because a is not single valued at equilibrium. However, since a is an 
upper-semi-continuous correspondence in (pl/p2) and is single valued when 
pi -# p2, our analysis is equivalent to that of "splicing together" along the 
pi = p2 hyperplane two separate Lipschitzian differential equation systems. 
Since a is not single valued, we might say that the system (3.1) to (3.4) 
possesses a generalized saddlepoint equilibrium. 
9. Assuming, of course, that initial prices are positive. 
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Observe that in this case 8 is declining through time. This is be- 
cause ,8 is a constant along every ray through the origin (where p 
decreases as the slope of the ray increases), and the path of develop- 
ment cuts every ray from the right. Also in this case, f2 is increasing 
through time since 
d log f2 (1-a-a2)X + > 0. 
dt =kic 
Therefore, from (3.5), P2 is falling at a rate faster than a constant 
absolute rate.' Thus, for all paths not leading to long-run balanced 
growth, the price of the capital good with the higher marginal 
product goes to zero in finite time. 
It should be remarked that all such programs of accumulation 
not converging to balanced growth ultimately reveal themselves to 
be permanently inefficient. Since on the path tending to balanced 
growth, investment is always specialized to the capital with the 
higher marginal product, output (and thus consumption!) is highest 
at every instant. Thus, in the sense of Phelps-Koopmans, the path 
leading to balanced growth dominates all other paths satisfying the 
system (3.1) to (3.4). From Figure II, it can be seen that paths not 
converging to balanced growth ultimately have both k, and k2 de- 
creasing. There exists a finite time after which the balanced growth 
capital stocks are both higher than on a nonbalanced growth com- 
parison path. Thus, in the sense of Dorfman-Samuelson-Solow- 
Radner finite time criterion, the path tending to balanced growth 
dominates all other paths satisfying (3.1) to (3.4).2 Not only does 
a short-run perfect foresight price system generate dynamic instabil- 
ity in our model competitive economy, but it may also lead to inter- 
temporal inefficiency in the allocation of investments 
1 p ( p2(0)f1(k1(0),kW ) 1 f (), k2(0)) <0 
f2(k1(0), MO()) 
for all k1(M) above OA and p2(0) < 1. Strictly speaking, equation (2.6) is defined only for nonnegative prices. In Sections IV and V, we focus on what happens when one of the prices goes to zero. 
2. The system (3.1) to (3.4) is similar in structure to the necessary Euler-Lagrange equations derived from certain Ramsey-type planning models. In fact if the Ramsey model is such that the Euler-Lagrange equations are 
autonomous, equilibrium is of the saddlepoint (or generalized saddlepoint) type. See, e.g., P. A. Samuelson and R. M. Solow, "A Complete Capital Model Involving Heterogeneous Capital Goods," this Journal, LXX (Nov. 1956), 537-62. In the planning models it is also necessary that certain transversality 
conditions be satisfied. In Sections IV and V of this paper, we try to answer 
the question: Are there or are there not mechanisms in the capitalist economy 
ensuring stability and efficiency of development? 
3. This statement will have to be qualified in Sections IV and V of this 
paper, in which we investigate the implications of various assumptions about 
markets and behavior. We do know, however, that for arbitrarily assigned initial prices, an economy following the system (3.1) to (3.4) may not be effi- 
cient. 
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Many of the special assumptions of the model presented above 
may be altered without changing the basic results: (1) Fixed coeffi- 
cients technology. In this case, the economy will converge to bal- 
anced growth only if initial prices are chosen so that 
P2(O) a21kc(O) 
pi (0) a1k2 (0) 
where q = min [ki/ai, k2/a2]. (2) The production function q= 
(k1 + k2a)a. This special case illustrates some of the problems 
that occur when capital goods are substitutes (f12 < 0). Also, this 
production function is a particularly interesting example because 
inefficient investment programs are so easy to recognize. If a > 1, 
a program with investment in K1 is inefficient; if a < 1, a program 
with investment in K2 is inefficient; if a = 1, then the allocation of 
investment is a matter of indifference. Using the fact that every- 
where f2 = af1, yields that, for the case a > 1, there exists a unique 
1 
balanced path Pi = 1/a, P2 = 1, 1c1 = O k2 = [aaa/X]I--a. For all 
initial assignments of the price vector but (1/a, 1), one of the prices 
goes to zero in finite time and tends ultimately to minus infinity. 
But on such "errant" paths the real variables do not tend to the 
origin as is the case when capital goods are complements. If initial- 
ly pi < 1/a, the system tends to 1c1 = 0, 1c2 = [aaa/X]I-a; whereas 
1 
if initially Pi > 1/a the system tends to 1c1 = [a/X]1-a, 1c2 = 0. 
Thus, for initial Pi - 1/a, development of the real system is effi- 
cient, for initial pi > 1/a, development is inefficient. (3) Different 
production functions in the different sectors. For cases like that 
treated by Hahn where there exists a unique balanced growth 
equilibrium, we conjecture, although have not proved, that the bal- 
anced growth equilibrium is of the (generalized) saddlepoint type. 
(4) Savings a constant fraction of income including capital gains. 
The dynamic analysis is basically unaltered but one further point 
arises. Capital gains can get so large that all of output is devoted to 
consumption, or capital losses can get so large that all of output is 
devoted to saving. 
IV. MARKET STRUCTURES 
There are (at least) two different assumptions about market 
structure which are consistent with the model already presented: 
futures markets today for all periods into the future, and perfect 
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spot markets without futures markets. Not surprisingly, it turns 
out that these different assumptions have very different implications 
for the behavior of the economy.4 
A. Futures markets for all periods into the future. As in the 
usual Walrasian analysis, we require all markets to be in equilibrium 
before any actual transactions take place.5 Assume that the auc- 
tioneer called off a set of prices corresponding to an "errant path," 
i.e., a path not converging to balanced growth. Recall that on such 
paths the price of one of the capital goods goes to zero in finite 
time. If capital goods are freely disposable, prices cannot become 
negative; when the price of a capital good is zero, capital gains must 
be nonnegative; but since rentals are positive, the rate of return 
is infinite. The other capital good has, of course, a finite rate of 
return. Hence, everyone demands the capital good whose price has 
become zero, and the market does not clear. The only trajectory 
along which markets will clear at all periods of time is the unique 
path converging to balanced growth. Thus, if Walrasian futures 
markets extending infinitely far into the future all clear, the econ- 
omy must converge to balanced growth. (It should be clear that 
this is not a tautological statement.) Notice, however, that if 
futures markets extend only a finite time into the future (no matter 
how far), the economy may follow an errant trajectory since all 
markets within that finite "horizon" may clear.6 
In the real world, there are, as we have suggested, futures 
4. As we have already noted, the dynamical system of our model 
is similar to that of a planned economy. But the questions on which we focus 
in this and the following section have meaning only for a market economy. 
For although the balanced growth equilibrium is a saddlepoint, in principle 
the planner can at any time correct any deviations from the optimal trajectory. 
As Samuelson and Solow pointed out, "This re-aiming is, so to speak, what an 
optimizing society is constantly doing." Op. cit., p. 548. 
5. The few futures markets which exist (usually in agricultural com- 
modities) bear only a faint resemblance to these Walrasian markets. The fact 
that in the real world individuals cannot make transactions today which are 
binding on their heirs makes the assumption of an atemporal (once-and-for-all) 
Walrasian market particularly implausible. 
It should be stressed that there is no need to consider price expectations 
in the atemporal Walrasian market. The auctioneer calls out trial prices for 
all dates; no contracts are binding until the auctioneer finds the full set of 
market clearing prices. 
6. But it will not follow the path forever. In finite time, one of the 
futures markets will not clear and the economy will set off on another tra- 
jectory. 
If, however, capital goods are not disposable (at any cost) then, prices 
can clearly be negative. Then the argument that Walrasian futures markets 
ensure stability, holds with important modifications. When pA = 0, utility- 
maximizing individuals will demand an infinite amount of K12 (since it is 
costless but yields positive rentals). Thus markets will not clear. A similar 
argument holds for the next subsection. 
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markets for only a few commodities, and those that do exist, extend 
only for a few periods into the future. Moreover, Hahn probably 
did not have this market structure in mind when he posed the 
problem of stability of the economy; Walrasian (once-and-for-all) 
markets make the problem of allocation an atemporal one. We 
turn, therefore, to the market economy with spot markets but with- 
out futures markets. 
B. Spot markets, but no futures markets. We shall show that 
the only path which is consistent with short-run perfect foresight 
for all periods (or long-run perfect foresight) is the unique path 
converging to balanced growth. To see this most clearly, let us 
assume that there are markets at finite, predetermined, equally 
spaced intervals.7 (We need to replace the capital market differ- 
ential equation by its discrete time analogue, but all the properties 
of the path remain unaffected.) Assume that the economy follows 
a path not converging to balanced growth. At some time T - 1 for 
the rate of return on K1 to equal that on K2, there must be a suffi- 
ciently large capital loss on K2 that p2T-1 plus the change in price 
yields a negative value of p2T. Consider the economy at T-1. Indi- 
viduals, realizing that prices must be positive, know that the return 
on holding K2 must exceed that on holding K1; they all demand K2, 
and its price "rises abruptly," 8 so that the realized price at T - 1 
is greater than the price that was expected at T - 2 to prevail on 
the market at T - 1. Thus, expectations are disappointed: the 
short-run perfect foresight assumption is violated. 
Thus any initial price for which (2.5) and (2.6) lead eventually 
to a nonpositive price is inconsistent with the assumption that 
short-run perfect foresight holds in every period. But we have 
already shown that there is only one path for which prices are 
always positive: the prices which lead the economy to balanced 
growth. (The same argument holds, of course, for long-run perfect 
foresight.) 
- Thus paths which do not converge to balanced growth are in- 
consistent with the assumption that expectations are fulfilled at 
every instant of time. This has one very important implication: 
when capital is freely disposable, the problem of maximizing present 
7. We present the argument in discrete time in order to avoid certain 
inessential problems arising when the set of dates before one of the prices goes 
to zero is an open set, i.e., when there exists no last moment. 
8. In the continuous time model, p2 would jump discontinuously at T. 
At T, short-run perfect foresight and instantaneously adjusted expectations 
differ, because at T the left-hand time derivative of p2 is not equal to the 
right-hand derivative. 
606 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
discounted value or maximizing intertemporal utility, given perfect 
foresight about prices, is well-defined only for the path which goes 
to balanced growth. Paths which do not converge to balanced 
growth may, however, be consistent with short-run perfect fore- 
sight for a finite number of periods. The question remains: is there 
anything to prevent the economy from setting off on an errant path? 
First, consider an individual with long-run foresight, who fore- 
sees today that the nonnegativity constraint on the price of, say, K2 
will be binding at time T. He realizes that at time T - 1 he -and 
everyone else - will demand K2, so that its price will rise. But this 
means that if he had bought K2 at T - 2, he would have made a 
larger return on K2 than on K1. So he - and everyone else - will 
demand K2 at T - 2, which raises its price at T - 2. And so on. 
Thus, the fact that the nonnegativity constraint is binding at T will 
cause the price of K2 to rise relative to that of K, today, and the 
only equilibrium prices in the market today will be those leading to 
balanced growth. 
If individuals see only a finite time ahead, then, of course, the 
economy may set off on an errant path; but in finite time, individ- 
uals will foresee that the nonnegativity constraint is binding, expec- 
tations will not be fulfilled, and the economy will set off on another 
trajectory. Finally, if individuals see only one period ahead, then 
the economy may indeed pursue an errant path with expectations 
frustrated at time T - 1 (if the nonnegativity constraint is binding 
at time T). 
In this section, we investigated two alternative market struc- 
tures corresponding to the model of Sections II and III. We showed 
that if there are Walrasian futures markets extending infinitely far 
into the future, then the economy will converge to balanced growth. 
We also showed that, in the case of spot markets with no futures 
markets, the only paths consistent with the short-run perfect fore- 
sight assumption holding in every period is the path converging to 
balanced growth. The following question remains: In the absence 
of long-run perfect foresight9 and futures markets, is there any 
mechanism which ensures that the economy does not set off initially 
on an errant path? To answer it, additional or alternative assump- 
tions about market structures and behavior must be introduced. In 
Section V, we turn to these alternative assumptions. 
9. It should be noted that previous writers have questioned the legiti- 
macy of the perfect foresight assumption in economics. See, eg., F. A. Hayek, 
"Economics and Knowledge," Essay II of Individualism and the Economic 
Order (University of Chicago Press, 1948), who argues that a statement like 
"perfect foresight ensures equilibrium" is essentially tautological. 
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V. RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
Four market and behavioral assumptions are crucial to the 
model we have presented in Sections II and III: (1) Capital goods 
markets are perfect. (2) Investment is allocated in order to max- 
imize short-run profits. (3) The savings decision is made according 
to some simple rule. (4) Individuals possess short-run perfect fore- 
sight (or at least instantaneously adjust their expectations). These 
four assumptions were made both because of their prominence in 
traditional economic theory and because they are thought to capture 
much of the spirit of how capitalist economies behave. In fact, 
however, alternative assumptions, involving more or less "ration- 
ality" and "perfection" may be made. We have investigated a large 
number of these, the most interesting of which are reported here. 
A. Imperfect capital goods markets. For many kinds of ma- 
chines, markets for renting and selling used capital goods are at 
best imperfect. Investors must then treat rentals differently from 
capital gains. To see how imperfect capital goods markets lend 
stability to the economy, consider the extreme case where there are 
no markets for renting or selling used capital goods, and hence no 
market prices or rental rates for used capital goods. An investor 
(now a producer) can buy either type of machine at a price of unity. 
And it is obvious that his investment decision will be to buy the 
machine that when cooperating with the investor's given stock of 
machines yields the higher marginal product. When K, and K2 
have the same marginal product, he will allocate his investment so 
as to maintain the equality of marginal products. Alternatively, 
even if there are rentals markets but there are two kinds of capital- 
ists (or firms) one of which buys only K1, and the other of which 
buys K2, so that there is no trading of K, for K2, and hence no 
capital market clearing equation, the system is also stable.' 
B. Financial intermediation. In the preceding analysis, we 
have implicitly assumed, as we have throughout this paper, that 
there exist in the economy only real assets. We have, in particular, 
assumed that securities (shares of equity in firms) are absent from 
the economy. In reality, of course, securities markets are probably 
the best organized markets in the capitalist economy whereas used 
capital goods markets are notoriously imperfect. To the extent that 
perfect securities markets serve as a partial substitute for perfect 
capital goods markets our previous analysis captures some of the 
1. This result holds whether capital goods are disposable or not. 
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most important features of the process of capitalist development.2 
There are, however, certain important aspects of actual finan- 
cial markets that may play a stabilizing role in the capitalist 
economy. For example, holders of securities do not seem to be indif- 
ferent between expected income from capital gains and from divi- 
dends because it seems that often expectations about the former 
are held with less certainty than expectations about the latter. 
There are also all the "frictions" ("orderliness") imposed upon 
securities markets by the exchanges and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. And, of course, institutions like the Federal Reserve 
System and the Treasury are designed to play a stabilizing role in 
the financial markets. To discuss these important issues in detail, 
however, would carry us beyond the scope of the present paper. 
C. Static expectations. It should be clear from our previous 
discussion that capital gains is a primary source for destabilization 
in the economy. Nonexistent or imperfect capital markets "solve" 
the problem of instability by essentially eliminating the possibility 
of capital gains. There is an additional force ameliorating the in- 
stability arising from capital gains: Individuals are not likely to 
possess perfect foresight or, in the language of adaptive expecta- 
tions,3 to adjust their expectations instantaneously. When, as along 
errant trajectories, price/earnings ratios become very small, individ- 
uals expect that the situation will not continue and bid the price up 
(and indeed, this expectation is justified, for we have already shown, 
price/earnings ratios cannot continue declining forever). In fact, 
Keynes argued in the General Theory that such conventional meth- 
ods "of calculation will be compatible with a considerable measure 
of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on 
the maintenance of this convention." 4 In order to examine the im- 
plications of this for our model, assume that the price expected for 
next period is exactly equal to the price this period, t+At = pig, 
2. Our interpretation of the destabilizing role of financial markets seems to be consistent with Keynes's view of this matter. On p. 160 of the General Theory, Keynes considers the possibility of requiring the holding of real assets to be made "indissoluble, like marriage except by reason of death or other grave cause . . . For this would force the investor to direct his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only." But Keynes rejects this scheme be- 
cause by reducing the liquidity of physical assets, society would make the holding of money much more attractive; thus depressing real investment. But 
any instability in capital goods markets that is removed by this device may 
reappear in the market for securities. 
3. Phillip Cagan in "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, ed. M. Friedman (University of Chicago Press, 1956), shows in a simple monetary economy with adaptive 
expectations, that the cruder the mechanisms of price adjustment the more likely is the system to be stable. 
4. The General Theory, p. 152. 
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= 1, 2. Then the capital goods market clearing equation is simply 
flI/Pl = f2/P2, so that the price of the capital good bearing the 
higher marginal product is always higher. Hence the economy 
always invests in the capital good with the higher marginal product 
(as we know, it should in order to get to balanced growth and for 
efficiency). Moreover, when fA = f2, Pi = P2, and hence the economy 
first goes to the ray of equal marginal products and then proceeds 
along that ray to balanced growth. 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The problems we have discussed in the context of allocation of 
investment in a dynamic economy belong to the more general theory 
of speculation and arise whenever holding more than one asset is a 
possibility, e.g., in international exchange speculation, in inventory 
policy, and in the demand for money. The common element is price 
appreciation. And the common problem is, as Samuelson has stated,5 
that "the market literally lives on its own dreams, and each individ- 
ual at every moment of time is perfectly rational to be doing what 
he is doing." 
The fact that imperfections and frictions are stabilizing influ- 
ences should be reassuring to some advocates of the capitalist 
economy. However, to the classical economist, who argues for the 
competitive pricing system on the basis of its efficiency in allocating 
resources,6 it raises the problem of showing that a dynamic economy 
where trading can exist at any moment of time acts as if all trans- 
actions took place in an atemporal Walrasian market. 
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